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Corporate Social Responsibility before CSR 










Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a relatively recent phenomenon for companies and their 
stakeholders. However, we cannot ignore its historical roots. Many companies, especially in industry, 
developed social and environmental policies and practices a long time ago. These practical and 
historical dimensions still remain absent from the academic literature on CSR. In this paper, we set out 
to study a case over an extended period—from 1950s until 1970s—in order to understand how 
manufacturers took into account the various economic, social and environmental aspects of their 
activity, when they made an investment and subsequently ran an aluminium production site. The case 
of the company Alucam, implanted in Cameroon, shows how manufacturers integrated the Triple 
Bottom Line well before the ‘invention’ of CSR. Since its creation in 1957, this plant designed to 
produce primary aluminium has systematically applied a policy that simultaneously integrated the 
economic, environmental and social impacts of its activity. However, such visible permanency masks 
important changes in the way that CSR has been applied over time. This case study provides a better 
understanding of the process of building CSR in the aluminium industry. With that goal in mind, our 
methodology is historical. Research was mainly carried out by means of studying the Alucam 
archives.  Such empirical research, highlighting the reality of the practices implemented in companies, 
constitutes an original contribution to the history of CSR. 
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The term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has only relatively recently been introduced 
into the language of the business world. Yet, academic literature on management shows that 
taking social and environmental concerns into account does not constitute a new phenomenon 
for companies and their stakeholders, at least since Bowen (1953). At the theoretical level, it 
should be accepted and recognized that CSR has historical roots. In fact, CSR constitutes one 
of the earliest key conceptions in the academic study of relations between business and 
society. And yet, although the historical anchoring of CSR is recognized at the theoretical 
level, it has given rise to very little empirical research highlighting the reality of policies and 
practices of social responsibility as it is adopted and applied in companies. It is unfortunate 
that practical and historical dimensions still remain absent from the academic literature on 
CSR.  
The main reason can be found in the methodological pitfalls that this kind of research raises. 
Indeed, the terminology held in the acronym CSR is of relatively recent brushwork. Yet, 
studying the actions and motives of managers in the past reveals that neither social nor 
environmental concerns were ignored. Moreover, these concerns formed part of a broader 
thinking that included more obvious economic and financial criteria. From a methodological 
point of view, in light of the fact that CSR did not exist during the period studied, we looked 
at motives, especially those unrelated to a company’s own economic and financial interests. 
We noticed in previous studies (Pezet, 2000) that economic and financial interests were not 
the sole purpose of investment decisions. We therefore chose to study Alucam because of its 
location—Africa, a continent supposedly more affected by new issues such as social and 
environmental questions. Other studies have shown that companies are bound to implement 
innovative practices when confronted with entirely new situations (Moquet, Pezet, 2006; 
Pezet, 2000). We set out to look for all sorts of motives, other than profit motives, in the 
archives. Indeed, this research was mainly carried out by means of studying the Alucam 
archives. In addition to this work on the archives, we used studies and academic research as 
well as oral and written testimonies made available by the IHA
2. Finally, we also mobilized 
other public archives and sources to triangulate our data. 
Another methodological difficulty stems from periodisation. Periodising is problematic here, 
given that these different aspects mostly occur simultaneously—the very premise that 
underpins our assumption that we are dealing with an early example of CSR.  However, it 
seems that the primary concern for all actors was economic, i.e. concern for both Pechiney’s 
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own interests and for the prospects of Cameroon’s and Africa’s development. The second 
concern was for people: social policy (salaries, health and accident insurance, social security 
benefits, etc.), improvements in living conditions, recruitment, education and training, and, 
ultimately, the ‘Cameroonisation’ of the staff. The final, and initially rather neglected, 
concern was for the environment. In this Alucam case study, we present the different 
components of CSR in this order of appearance (without forgetting, however, that they often 
overlapped)—economic, social and environmental aspects. 
In this context, it seems relevant to undertake a historical analysis of CSR strategies and 
practices before the concept of CSR arose in Europe during the 1990s. Indeed, many 
companies, especially in industry, developed social and environmental policies and practices 
much earlier on. In this paper, we set out to study a case over a period in the past, from the 
1950s to the 1970s, in order to understand how manufacturers took into account the various 
economic, social and environmental aspects of their activity, at a time when CSR did not yet 
exist. 
The aluminium industry was, at an early stage, confronted with both globalization and 
societal issues (Loison, Pezet 2006; Grinberg, Pezet, 2006). Indeed, the context of 
international investment was favourable to the conception and implementation of strategies, 
which, beyond economic interest, contained social and environmental dimensions. 
Aluminium du Cameroun (Alucam) was created in 1957 as a subsidiary of the French group 
Pechiney
3. Since its creation, this primary aluminium producing plant has systematically 
applied a policy that simultaneously integrated economic, environmental and social facets.  
When Pechiney began its activity in Edéa (Cameroon), the company was not entirely a novice 
in matters of major investments abroad (Beau, Danjou and David 1975; Cailluet 1995). Even 
though some of them were aborted, Pechiney’s experiences in the United States and Norway 
in the 1910s, and in Italy, Spain and the USSR in the inter-war period, bear witness to this. 
Yet the Edéa site (and its contemporary, Fria, in Guinea) posed new problems for Pechiney 
and raised new doubts, particularly in relation to the country's colonial and postcolonial 
history. In French Cameroun, Pechiney set up in unknown territory. It was the French firm’s 
first international investment in Africa. It was also the very first industrial investment of this 
scale in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, it took place in a colonial territory administered by French 
institutions and people
4. 
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The company’s interest in setting up this plant was two-fold. Firstly, following World War II, 
Pechiney had great difficulties in maintaining a strong position faced with competition from 
the North American giants (Alcoa and Alcan). In this light, Africa represented an opportunity 
in terms of energy and mining resources
5. French Cameroun, notably, offered sizeable 
hydroelectric capacity, which was indispensable to Pechiney after the nationalization of the 
French electric company Electricité de France (EDF) in 1946. Secondly, French colonial 
policy during this period shifted towards the idea of a fairer exchange that would enable the 
development of territories and not simply their exploitation. Incentive policies were drawn up 
backed by financial aid and tax incentives provided by various national and international 
institutions (such as the Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer and the United Nations, for 
instance). The economic, social and human development of Africa as well as its 
industrialization was part of the arguments used to promote the project to build a primary 
aluminium smelter and several processing facilities in Cameroun. 
Despite the impact of these economic, social and human arguments in favour of implanting an 
aluminium production site in Cameroun, and in Africa more broadly, the project faced various 
opposition movements by its stakeholders (local small firms, anti-colonialist movements, 
etc.). The project’s negotiation phase, which brought together the company, the French and 
Camerounian authorities and opponents of the scheme, provided Pechiney with the first 
opportunity to draw up and put into practice a policy that combined economic, social and, to a 
lesser degree, environmental dimensions of the project.  
The way in which a company responds to economic, social and environmental issues is 
indicative of its social responsibility. Though these issues were hardly unknown at the time, 
they took on a whole new dimension in Africa and for this reason it was vital that investment 
in French Cameroun should be both responsible and sustainable. We assess these issues here 
under three headings, by order of appearance: economic issues, human and social issues, and 
environmental issues. However, we first outline the existing literature on CSR from a 
historical perspective and the general historical context of other-than-profit motives in the 
aluminium industry before Alucam. 
 
CSR from a historical viewpoint: literature review 
From an overview of the literature on CSR—which has been abundantly documented and 
commented on—we can outline the following series of stages: the Friedmanian conception 
(1962) of the maximisation of profit alone for the benefit of shareholders broadly dominated 
                                                 
5 The production of aluminium depends on two strategic factors: electricity and bauxite (which, in this case, came from Guinea). 5 
 
thinking; it removed all other concerns for a corporation. And yet in 1953, Bowen began 
thinking about CSR as a way of integrating the values sought by society beyond shareholders’ 
economic interests. Carroll (1979) developed the concept further by suggesting the Triple 
Bottom Line. In 1985, Cochran and Wartick expanded the concept of CSR by introducing 
principles of responsibility to give it structure. Finally, Wood (1991) established the links 
between CSR, its implementation and its impact on corporate behaviour. Over time, a 
consensus defined CSR as a response to the need to maximize a company’s goals through 
profitability for the benefit of the shareholder but also for the benefit of its other stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984). Hence, the company’s pursuit of three objectives: honouring its obligations 
to stakeholders, responding to social demands arising from the socio-economic environment, 
and using CSR as a management tool. However, the structuring of the concept borrows 
heavily, simultaneously, and sometimes in a contradictory manner, from a variety of different 
schools of thought, including ethical-religious, ecological, and both libertarian and 
interventionist thinking. Lastly, the lack of a unifying paradigm is patently obvious. What is 
also striking from this literature review is the lack of truly empirical work on CSR.  6 
 
Table 1 – Summary of the theoretical literature on CSR 
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The background of the concept may be more or less known, at least as far as we can tell. Yet 
the history of its practices remains to be told, since such practices certainly date back to 
before 1953 (Bowen). In fact, some studies do exist that call into question a number of 
commonly held assumptions. Environmental issues were a precocious concern in our 
societies, especially with the growth of cities and the rise of industry (Thorsheim, 2006; 
Schott, Luckin, Massard-Guilbaud, 2005; Tarr, 2005, 1998; Bernhardt, Massard-Guibaud, 
2002). Tarr (1998) develops a conceptual framework in which urban pollution flows from the 
interaction between technology and scientific knowledge, culture and social values and 
finally, the environment, including environmental policy and its control devices. Seen in such 
a light, decrees, police orders or acts of parliament (for instance, Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1810 7 
 
decree in France) soon appear no different to today’s pressure groups, occurring as they often 
did in a political and intellectual context in which belief in improving public hygiene, not to 
say in eugenics, was growing. Ultimately, the issue of the environment become strongly tied 
to the question of political order (or disorder) (Bernhardt, Massard-Guibaud, 2002). A healthy 
environment was thus considered to be a guarantee of political order.  
However, it is historical research into environmental and, to a lesser extent, social practices 
that interests us here. We touch upon a few examples here, chosen for their relevance to the 
Alucam case study. The aim of these scholars (Meisner Rosen, Tarr, and Uekoetter in 
particular) was firstly to position environmental history in relation to the classical history of 
corporations. Ultimately, such a project calls into question the Chandler’s paradigm, because 
issues such as industrial pollution and the ensuing conflict between corporations and 
environmental movements challenge the Chandlerian vision of vertical integration. Top 
management were found to be unable to ignore issues of pollution in their decision making. 
As Meisner Rosen (1997, 1999) shows is, managers were confronted with problems of 
pollution at an early stage. Whether or not they sought to reduce pollution, they were 
undeniably aware of its existence. Meisner Rosen (1997) thus highlights the link between 
environmental issues and the growth of R&D in the building sector. She specifies three 
decisive factors in studying problems of pollution from a historical viewpoint: technology, the 
role played by the market, and the role played by the State, which influences the interactions 
between business and the environment (Meisner Rosen, 1999). Ecological protest movements 
have also played a major role in getting corporations to change (Meisner Rosen, 1997; 
Uekoetter, 1999). From these diverse observations two main streams emerge: firstly, the issue 
of the environment, which is a history of pollution; and secondly, the issue of social 
responsibility.  
Environmental issues have been the focus of a large number of studies centring on two 
perspectives: the impact of legislation, and corporate initiatives. The work of Lindmark and 
Bergquist (2008) analyses the very heavy positive influence of environmental legislation on 
steelmakers in Sweden and Canada during the 1960s. Reaching further back in time, Meisner 
Rosen (2003) examines the way in which legislation worked towards repairing the 
environmental damage inflicted on local communities living near heavy industry during the 
first Industrial Revolution.  
The second perspective has focused on the reactions of companies faced with environmental 
issues. Stradling and Tarr (1999) study the strategies of the railroad industry in Chicago when 
it faced problems of air pollution in the 19
th century. This work ascertains that the 8 
 
Pennsylvania Railroad reacted to public protests by transforming them into internal 
problematics designed to change behaviours. In the end, the company electrified its railroads. 
Uekoetter (1999) compares the behaviours of German and American senior managers when 
compelled to tackle air pollution in the period from 1880 to 1917. Noting that historical 
studies on the subject converge on the idea that entrepreneurs are systematically remiss in 
their efforts towards the environment, Uekoetter instead examines how economic and 
financial interests can sometimes fall in line with environmental issues. He therefore rails 
against the commonly held assumption that views the industrial world as systematically being 
a “negative force”.  
Meisner Rosen (1995) sets out from the same premise: companies act because the costs 
pertaining to pollution—notably medical and economic costs (black smoke stains, damage to 
buildings, machines and even clothing)—are simply too high. In response to these problems, 
certain industrialists belonging to Chicago’s high society established a ‘Society’ that 
embodied values close to those of CSR. This experiment ended in failure due, notably, to the 
opposition of less affluent employers as well as to accusations of corruption that robbed the 
Society of all legitimacy. 
Legislation and managerial actions can also complement each other. Gorman (1999) focuses 
on the production of brine during the extraction process of crude oil in the southern states of 
the United States between 1920 and 1970. This salt water generally ended up in fresh water 
reservoirs. The scholar describes how efforts by the public authorities in close collaboration 
with the companies to regulate this practice led these same companies to innovate in order to 
reduce the salinisation of the drinking water.  
The history of social responsibility practices is less developed than environmental history. Yet 
some research tackles this history from various angles without claiming to define elements of 
general knowledge. Nevertheless, it suggests strong interest in issues of responsibility dating 
back as far as the end of the 19
th century. Ethics and religion were powerful drivers at that 
time. As Max Weber (1967) has shown, Protestantism played a founding role in the 
emergence and propagation of capitalism. The consequence of this was that managers took on 
a degree of social responsibility (the precursor of CSR). This was expressed in their discourse 
on developing philanthropic activities (Acquier, Gond and Igalens, 2005). Philanthropy 
epitomised the American model until the 1950s (Marinetto, 1999). It combined with the 
development of management methods in big firms. Using the example of the tobacco industry 
pre-1939, Fitzgerald and Hirao (2005) show how British managers associated their 9 
 
philanthropic actions with a certain way of managing employees (sick-pay policies for the 
sick, for instance), with standardising procedures, and with certain accounting practices.  
Social and environmental accounting has even been the subject of specific research that 
shows that its emergence goes back much further—to some time between the late 19
th and 
early 20
th centuries—than is widely believed (Maltby, 2005, 2004; Unerman, 2003; Gallhofer, 
Haslam, 1993; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Lewis, Parker & Sutcliffe, 1984; Hogner,1982). More 
broadly, but with a link to both accounting and accountability, Salomon and Thomson (2009) 
describe how, as far back as the mid-19
th century, the engineer Frederick Braithwaite became 
aware of pollution in the Wandle River between Croydon and the Thames. They show how 
his ‘account’ exposed and problematized business practices in Victorian society. In a similar 
vein, Solomon and Thompson (2007) reveal the intellectual workings of environmental 
concerns in their study of William Morris. 
All of these studies, of which our review here is by no means exhaustive, show that 
environmental and social concerns are not a recent occurrence in corporate history. Our own 
case study of the aluminium industry also shows this to be true.  
 
The context in which social and environmental issues emerged in the aluminium 
industry in general and in Cameroun in particular 
From the outset of its industrialisation in the late-19
th century, the aluminium sector had to 
take into account the social and environmental aspects tied to its production (Smith, 1988). 
The French producer Pechiney was no exception to this rule (Menegoz, 1997, 1991). From 
this viewpoint, the “conquest” of Africa was a one-off opportunity to apply new principles, 
given the unusual context in which it occurred that raised questions about the well established 
customs common to French colonial territories at that time.  
 
The French aluminium industry was soon confronted with issues other than economic and 
financial 
Before dealing with the practices of Pechiney in French Cameroun, a brief overview is needed 
to situate the issues at play. Historically, the aluminium sector, much like other industries, has 
been confronted with social issues. Indeed, the specific activities involved in producing and 
processing aluminium compelled companies in the sector to develop, both in France and 
abroad, a highly advanced social policy at a very early stage. Implementation of social 
practices from the late-19
th century onwards was mainly a response to necessities of a 
technical and economic nature specific to steel-making industries. Implanting factories close 10 
 
to sources supplying water and raw materials led to significant geographical isolation bringing 
about the marked autonomy of remote production sites.  
In such a context, a company needed to offer its workforce living conditions that compensated 
firstly for the distance from urban areas and secondly for the tough working conditions in 
order to attract and mobilise, and then to stabilise and consolidate its manpower. With this 
goal in mind, companies generally did not limit themselves simply to satisfying their workers’ 
material living conditions (housing, basic hygiene, health and safety, etc.); in addition, social 
works that provided social protection (family benefits, pensions, etc.) and responded to the 
needs of families, including schooling, training, cultural, religious and leisure pursuits 
supplemented the panoply of services provided by industrialists in the sector. Truly 
autonomous cities sprouted up around the plants, creating discrete communities. On this 
point, Bourguinat (1989) highlights “the role of the factory’s social regulator” with regard to 
the Pechiney factory at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne in France in the early 1920s: 
“Little by little, the various plants were compelled to build around themselves a small 
core of personnel, a micro-society in which the social security provided by accident 
insurance and family benefits paid by the company formed part of a social policy 
founded first and foremost on housing. The trade-off for this loss of individual 
autonomy was earning regular income—albeit modest—as well as valuable perks and 
services.” (Bourguinat, 1989) 
These social practices first emerged in the companies’ national territories and were 
subsequently adapted for export abroad during the growing internationalisation of the sector 
in the second half of the 20
th century. The nature of the tools of social policy obviously 
evolved over time according to the social problematics faced by the factories, companies and 
groups in the sector.  Broadly speaking, the social history of the big industrial groups in 
aluminium has its roots in the paternalist practices implemented, first of all, in plants on a 
local scale and then, more generally, at the level of whole companies and groups, including 
abroad
6. Indeed, traces of this original paternalist policy can still be found in the 
contemporary social practices of multinationals in the sector. Moreover, at its outset, the 
social policy was strongly imbued with the technician values typical of the engineering 
culture that characterises the aluminium industry and according to which “the technical 
dictates to the social” (Vindt, 2006, p. 11). 
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From its inception, social policy mainly pertained to relations between the company and its 
employees and their families. Subsequently, social concerns gradually shifted from relations 
with the workforce towards relations with society as a whole.  
The company became a genuine social actor that had to act in compliance with the 
expectations and values of wider society and no longer solely with those of the local 
community in which the plant was located. This change of perspective required an expansion 
of the social practices implemented by companies without neglecting relations with the 
workforce, which remained at the heart of corporate social policy and was progressively 
institutionalised.  
Aside from its social policy, the aluminium sector also needed to develop environmental 
practices rapidly. The aluminium industry generated high levels of pollution and was the 
source of large amounts of environmental damage (air, water, ground, etc.) and of various 
nuisances that are more or less dangerous to local populations living near its plants (fumes, 
odours, dust, etc.). Such pollution equally caused harmful repercussions for cattle breeding 
and agriculture in regions in which electrometallurgical factories were located. Under these 
conditions, the industry very quickly found itself compelled to provide concrete solutions in 
response to the demands and criticisms, even the accusations and complaints, from 
populations living in their vicinity. 
Similar to the social dimension, the environmental dimension has been one of the strategic 
challenges faced by the aluminium industry since its beginnings. However, unlike the 
permanence of its social policy, implementing practices designed to tackle the impact of 
corporate activities on the environment derives from a fairly uneven and painfully slow 
process. Above and beyond the use of palliative-type tools until the mid-20
th century, the 
development of a truly environmental policy proved to be relatively late in coming in light of 
the precocious nature of demands made by this industry’s stakeholders regarding 
environmental issues.  
Accordingly, environmental concerns have often struggled to impose themselves in this sector 
that, for a long time, has denied many of the nuisances and downplayed their consequences in 
favour of promoting the advantages created in terms of jobs and benefits for the local 
economies:  
“In this area, the Pechiney men have not been ahead of their times. Aside from a few 
pioneers, industrial firms only became truly aware of environmental problems in the 
1970s. For engineers working in aluminium and alumina, their first thoughts were of 
technique and production. At that time, people refused to talk about pollution because at 12 
 
Pechiney, the general idea was to say: ‘there’s no pollution’. People refused to see 
things as they really were.” (Grinberg and Mioche, 1996, p.194) 
However, one significant point of friction—fluorine emissions—soon emerged as a genuine 
obstacle to implanting aluminium production sites in a peaceful manner: 
“A Swiss Federal report published in 1893 mentions an aluminium factory, threatened 
with closure due to nuisances, which installed a tower in which air from the potline was 
cleaned by pulverising water. Aluminium production clearly did not have a good 
reputation and, during the public planning inquiry for building Saussaz in 1905 [an 
aluminium plant at Maurienne in the Alps], local farmers demanded that ‘the dust and 
the smoke be captured’.” (Ménégoz in Morel, 1992, p.140) 
Some projects, especially those relating to opening plants or using new turbine water channels 
required to produce electricity were thus the focus of loud protests, even genuine opposition 
campaigns, from the local communities concerned. In 1924, a project by Pechiney to build 
turbine water channels at Drac Inférieur (in the Alps) was abandoned due to protests relating 
to smoke emissions from an aluminium factory close to a large town, in this case Grenoble. 
Likewise, in 1933, the Pechiney factory at Sabart (in the Pyrenees) was subject to complaints 
about damage to crops, which led to an inquiry by the local Préfecture on the request from the 
Ministère de la santé publique.  
Faced with such problems and demands of a mainly environmental nature, for a long time 
French industrialists adopted a technique stance in relation to what was perceived as a 
technical problem, whenever it was not being denied. The first responses to environmental 
issues resorted to adopting in a limited manner less polluting processes and clean-up systems 
and, in particular, to providing financial compensation.  
The main device used by industrialists regarding environmental issues was to pay for 
reparations for any damage caused as well as paying damages to the victims. Thus, in 1924, 
the board of directors of the company Alais, Froges et Camargue
7 discussed the affair of the 
Cardon fish (in Gard in the south of France): 
 “At certain times in the year, under controlled conditions, we emit into the Avène, a 
tributary of the Cardon, at Salindres the residual water from the factory. This year, this 
operation has caused the death of a certain number of fish, for which the Ministère had 
prepared a transaction to the amount of 400 Frs. The Préfet of the Gard has just decided 
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to halt the transaction and to bring the question before the Conseil Général, which has 
ruled that the Département should lodge a complaint against the Company”. 
Above and beyond financial compensation, the group’s factories were sometimes led, whether 
voluntarily or otherwise, to improve their production systems using less polluting equipment. 
In France, one effort of this type was the implementation of a system to capture gas emissions 
at the Pechiney factory at Saussaz (Alps) in 1905 in order to reduce fluorine emissions 
following complaints from local residents and farmers (Grinberg, 2003, p.46).  In 1934, in 
order to improve the cleaning of smoke emissions, the Pechiney factory at Sabart (Pyrenees) 
installed a system of electrostatic filtering onto the stack of the pulverised coal furnace. The 
favourable results led to a similar project to install a filter on the tunnel furnace. The Board 
announced on this point: “it was a matter of significant expenditure imposed by the new 
legislation, but from which we will draw some benefit due to reductions in indemnities for 
damages to agriculture that we are currently compelled to pay to neighbouring landowners”. 
In this case, we note that financial motives converged with action for the environment, which 
remained in effect regardless. Finally, the group sometimes carried out environmental 
initiatives in fields other than its own industrial activity, such as financing a project to set up a 
National Park in the Camargue from 1928 onwards.  
However, until the mid-20
th century, experimental techniques for collecting and processing 
smoke emissions remained ineffective in reducing pollution. Paying damages therefore 
constituted the most suitable practice, from the industrialists’ viewpoint, for dealing with 
growing protests from local residents. Thus, until the 1960s, companies in the sector clearly 
positioned themselves in an adaptive, even defensive, posture in reaction to the demands and 
protests of their stakeholders. For a long time, corporate environmental practices remained 
reactive and driven by either pressure from stakeholders or legislation.  
Generally, the solutions adopted were limited to curative actions and time-bound investments 
mainly designed to modify existing installations in order to reduce pollution upstream of 
production processes (Boiral, 1998, p. 2). Voluntary action remained uncommon and was 
generally situated outside the field of the company’s economic activity.  The practices 
implemented seemed to be aimed primarily at complying with legislation or at silencing 
critics in order to enable economic activity to continue and develop under normal conditions. 
This pressure constituted the main constraint that could compromise the social legitimacy of a 
company’s activities and its ultimate survival. At that time, there was no real environmental 
awareness to be found in this industry. We are still far from CSR practices per se. 14 
 
Ultimately, these devices proved to be both ineffective in reducing environmental damage and 
very costly for companies. Companies were therefore gradually led to integrate environmental 
concerns in the design phase of their production processes. According to Boiral (1998, p. 2), 
“developing preventative approaches responded to the need to find new alternatives to offset 
increases in the cost of clean-ups and the limitations of palliative-type actions”. Moreover, 
from 1950 onwards, the rise of ecological movements as well as the application of more 
demanding environmental regulations compelled industrialists systematically to seek out 
effective technical solutions to fight against pollution. However, it was not until the early 
1970s that an effective system of capturing emissions was developed in France. Such 
evidence does show that actions carried out by the industry, either voluntarily or by force, to 
limit the impact of its activity on the natural and social environment dates back a long way. 
Broadly speaking, these responses characterise the attitude of an industry that, until the 1980s, 
remained strongly attached to its technician values. This relationship between technique and 
the environment did not pertain to the aluminium sector alone; it represented a broad trend for 
all companies until the mid-1980s:  
“One undoubtedly essential issue resides in the shift in the highly complex relationship 
between the environment and technique (…) Research and development on clean 
techniques, for instance, contributed to the fact that the environment, as both a concept 
and a concern, navigated with relative ease around the rocks of the economic crisis 
when this crisis deepened at the end of the 1970s and early 80s. Yet more important was 
that technique began to allow companies to take back some of the ground that it 
appeared to have lost. The technical dimension enabled them to reposition themselves 
discretely in the area of the environment” (Boullet, 1999, p.339).  
The Alucam case study ascribes relatively well to these practices, which are old yet 
intermittent, and which spanned social issues that were continuously addressed and 
environmental issues that elicited greater reluctance, even out-right denial.   
 
The “conquest” of Africa by Pechiney: States and Men 
The context of implantation in Cameroun is closely tied to the colonial history of France in 
Africa, to Pechiney’s history and, ultimately, to the men—given the total absence of 
women—involved in the operation. Within the framework of this paper, it is impossible to 15 
 
provide a detailed panorama of all these different aspects; here, we set out to outline several 
basic features
8. 
France built its colonial ideology on the premise that its civilisation was superior to those of 
other peoples. The ideas developed by Le Bon, Spencer and Darwin, which were often taken 
out of context and distorted, provided the intellectual layer of this ideology. As Schuerkens 
(2008, p. 1) points out: 
“In its ideal form, [this ideology] resembles the colonial policy of England. Improving 
the material and social conditions for the indigenous people became the main goal. 
Nevertheless, the French had to develop [the indigenous people] in such a manner that 
they kept their positions, functions and roles in their own cultural systems. Respect for 
their traditions and their customs would serve to achieve these goals. Carrying out this 
policy of association required in-depth knowledge of the local populations, which could 
only be achieved through prolonged contact. It was in this way that this policy would 
ensure reconciliation between the rights of the victors and the interests of indigenous 
populations, the vanquished…”. 
Girardet noted that colonial France was built not on a single theory, like that of Lord Lugard 
in England, but “on a broader system (...) of prejudices, beliefs and mental habits, tied to the 
very deep and more or less unanimously held conviction of the obvious primacy of European 
civilisation, in truth the only Civilisation, in relation to all other human societies” (Girardet, 
1972, p. 89). The French colonial policy was paradoxically deeply pragmatic, leaving actors 
in situ free to act according to their own analysis of the situation (Schuerkens, 2008). This 
policy left the door open to abuses, which are amply described elsewhere
9. The only guiding 
principle was to impose the model of French civilisation because of its obvious superiority.  
The Alucam project was carried out at the time of decolonisation, i.e. when these old 
principles and premises of the French Empire were being called into question and were 
widely misunderstood. World War II undermined the position of mainland France and raised 
the issue of maintaining French domination in a colonial Empire that reached its peak in the 
late-1930s. Dragged down by the weak and unstable parliamentary regime of the IVe  
République, France did not take note of the rise of emancipation movements of indigenous 
peoples in its colonies. Unlike the United Kingdom, France did not have any experience with 
decolonisation. The French maintained the illusion that minor accommodations would suffice 
                                                 
8 For a broader history, see Laparra, Grinberg (2007). 
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to maintain their hold over the Empire. Until 1958, they would be carried along by events 
over which they had less and less control.  
However, from 1956 onwards, the decolonisation of sub-Saharan Africa was carried out in a 
peaceful manner, unlike the decolonisation of both Algeria and Indochina. The Deferre 
framework law, passed in 1956 by Guy Mollet’s socialist government, granted relatively 
broad autonomy to the African Territories, which could now elect a local Assemblée with the 
power to appoint a governing Council with a Vice President who, by law, had to be an 
African. Back in power in 1958, Charles de Gaulle pursued this policy by proposing that 
Overseas Territories become members of a French Community, chaired by himself, to prepare 
the way towards independence. In African, only Sekou-Touré’s Guinea rejected this proposal 
and immediately declared independence. The other Territories of sub-Saharan Africa and 
Madagascar became members of the Community before achieving independence themselves 
in 1960.  
Pechiney’s implantation in Cameroun occurred during this key period. Relations with the new 
power in Cameroon remained stable and the violence that swept Cameroon, particularly 
during the “bloody week” in May 1955, did not affect the construction site (Abwa, 2007). The 
conflict opposing President Ahidjo and “subversives” (represented by the Union of the 
Peoples of Cameroon) seemed to attract the attention of the powerful far more than Alucam. 
Negotiations to protect Pechiney’s stake in the plant—unlike events in Guinea, see below—
began before Ahidjo came to power and continued afterwards. Pechiney’s men, backed by the 
French government, were particularly attentive to maintaining good relations with the new 
State.   
In this respect, the men chosen were of particular importance. Pechiney therefore mobilised:  
§  “Men of aluminium”: engineers by training, Jean Matter and Jean Grolée began their 
careers at Pechiney before the War. They knew the sector’s techniques and economy 
perfectly; 
§  Men of construction and of electricity: the engineer Paul Guinet; 
§  Functional managers: Jacques Ribadeau-Dumas, head of social affairs and 
subsequently head of African affairs at Pechiney, and Jacques Henry, who followed 
him into African affairs; 
§  Politicians: Jacques Marchandise, civil servant and government advisor; 
§  The visionary: Marc-Edmond Morgaut, psychologist and author of books and research 
on Africa. 17 
 
We will pause for a moment on this last personality, who is less known than the others in the 
history of aluminium. His experiences in Guinea acted as a benchmark for Alucam. Marc-
Edmond Morgaut was the first to apply psycho-technical tests in Guinea for all ethnic groups 
without discrimination. There, he put in place in 1959 a four-year plan designed (1) to foster 
training and education, because he thought that technical training cannot take place with its 
“educational complement”; (2) to promote the idea that “among the 800 Africans in jobs, 
none should be refused an opportunity”, by means of implementing a system of study 
contracts identical to those developed in the People’s Republic of China; and, (3) to promote 
Africanisation (Larrue, 1997, pp 161). Morgaut commented that the decision to send 
Europeans overseas should take into account their personalities more than their qualifications 
or even their experiences abroad. Pechiney should recruit people who are curious about the 
civilisation they are to encounter and careful to develop mutual understanding and dialogue 
(Larue, 1997, pp 258). He was also the author of Un Dialogue Nouveau : L'Afrique Et 
L'Industrie, published by Fayard in 1959, of L'Homme Et La Creation... Et Si, Demain Dieu 
S'Avisait De Refaire L'Univers, published by Masson (1991) and of “Cinq années de 
psychologies africaines”, a paper appearing in the journal Tiers Monde in 1964. Morgaut 
therefore played a major role in implementing innovative practices well before CSR.  
Having presented the general outline of the context, we now set out the Alucam case study in 
its various aspects, in chronological order of their appearance and without forgetting that they 
often overlap: economic issues (from the project’s financial profitability to its impact on 
development in Cameroon and Africa), social issues, and environmental issues.  
 
Economic issues that go beyond corporate profit  
The economic aspect of Alucam’s investment was truly original. Beyond the financial profits 
expected from the project, Pechiney planned to make a contribution to the development of 
Cameroon and Africa. This determination was reinforced by the decolonisation going on at 
the time. French colonial policy was moving towards the idea of a fairer balance, in which it 
would be possible to develop, and not just to exploit, the countries it occupied. The economic, 
social and human development of Africa, as well as its industrialisation, has always been 
among the arguments associated with Alucam, both at the time of the plant’s creation and 




Pechiney’s strategic and financial expectations 
Africa was for many years a territory envied by aluminium industrialists; its resources of both 
energy and bauxite elicited much speculation. When Pechiney finally launched a project 
specific to Cameroun, the usual strategic (competition, access to resources, technology) and 
financial motives were mobilised in a context that also presented some new challenges. 
  
Aluminium and Africa: an old and complex history 
Alais, Froges et Camargue (AFC), the precursor of Pechiney, was interested in Africa at an 
early stage. The French producer was not the only one to have identified the continent’s 
resources: competitors, such as the French Ugine, Canadian Alcan, British Baco, and the 
American firms Alcoa and Olin Mathieson; producers of electricity (EDF); but also the 
American and French governments and, in particular the Ministère de la France d’outre-mer 
and its local representatives, saw great investment opportunities. The bauxite in Guinea and 
the potential for energy generation in French Cameroun sharpened their appetites. Africa, the 
essentially colonial land, was the subject of speculation of all sorts, from both corporations 
and States.  
 
Map n°1 – Colonial Africa in the 20
th Century 
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In 1921, the Compagnie des bauxites du Midi, which belonged to Alcan, acquired concessions 
in the Guinean islands of Loos. In 1942, AFC was endowed with an African affairs 
department and sent a mission to Guinea, with the backing of the Vichy government seeking 
to maintain control over its Empire, whose goal was to study the availability of bauxite and 
energy. Elsewhere, the energy potential of French Cameroun attracted the attention of the 
French. In 1946 and 1947, the nationalised company Electricité de France (EDF) carried out 
studies into hydroelectric installations in French Cameroun and set up the public-private 
partnership, Energie électrique du Cameroun (Enelcam). The projects moved forward quickly 
and, in 1947, a mission led by Pechiney returned to Africa and identified several sites for 
building an integrated plant for processing bauxite into refined aluminium. In 1950, EDF set 
up the company Energie électrique de Guinée (EEG). In 1951, Pechiney and Ugine created 
the Société africaine de recherches et d’études pour l’aluminium (Sarepa) in order to develop 
the plant project. In the same period, the British began to study a project for an aluminium 
plant in the Gold Coast (the future Ghana). In 1952, Alcan opened its site for processing 
bauxite on the Loos islands and studied other opportunities for implantation. In the same year, 
as Enelcam sought customers for its energy, Pechiney was studying a project for an 
aluminium refinement plant in French Cameroun. This type of production did not consume 
sufficient amounts of electricity so the project was quickly abandoned, but the idea of 
aluminium production did emerge.  
In 1953, following a reports by the Commission des mines of the Commissariat général au 
plan that raised concerns about the high levels of expenditure needed for an integrated plant, 
the Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer approved a project of partnership with other European 
producers presented by Jean Matter, the vice managing director of Pechiney. In July of the 
same year, Jean Grolée and Jacques Ribadeau-Dumas, director of the aluminium division and 
general secretary of the Sarepa respectively, organised a mission to decide on the site for the 
plant in Cameroun; the site of Edéa was chosen. The following month, a programme for 
expanding capacity, approved by the board of directors, laid out plans to equip small turbine 
water channels in France and then to build an electrolysis plant in Cameroun and, ultimately, 
an integrated site processing bauxite into refined aluminium in Guinea. In November, the site 
of Fria in Guinea was chosen to accommodate the integrated plant, but the installations, and 
notably the hydroelectric works, made the building schedule too long. The market could only 
wait six to eight years. The decision to build a smelter in French Cameroun was then taken, 
even though other potential projects were not mothballed. 20 
 
In 1955, the Société européenne pour l’étude de l’industrie de l’aluminium en Afrique (Afral) 
was set up by Pechiney, in association with German, Italian and Swiss producers. 
Simultaneously, the Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer created the Société civile d’études 
hydroélectriques du Konkouré et du Kouilou
10 with Afral and Alcan in order to study the 
possibility of building installations on the two rivers.  
In 1956, demand for aluminium was so great that Pechiney considered building facilities on 
both river sites simultaneously. In July, the Board assigned the task of carrying out the project 
of building a site on the Konkouré for an aluminium plant to a company bringing together 
Afral and Alcan. The choice of Konkouré was in line with the Ministère’s preference. At the 
same moment, the Ministère authorised Pechiney, associated with the American company 
Olin-Mathieson and with the British company Baco, to implant an alumina plant in Guinea. In 
December, the Compagnie internationale pour la production d’alumine (Fria) was set up. 
Building work began. 
In July 1957, the Société hydroélectrique du Kouilou was officially created. Building works 
along the river began in 1958, in collaboration with the Belgians. In the same year, the 
Société d ’aluminium de Guinée (Alugui) and the Société hydroélectrique de Souapiti were 
created in order to generate energy on the Konkouré. This was the year that Sekou Touré 
opted for independence. Only the alumina plant was completed. In 1959, building works on 
the two rivers (Konkouré and Kouilou) was finally abandoned for political and economic 
reasons. 
In 1960, Alcan proposed to Pechiney a partnership to process the bauxite at Boké in Guinea. 
This project never came to fruition. The US government then decided to aid Guinea to build 
along the Konkouré and to produce aluminium (with Alcoa), but Sekou Touré negotiated an 
agreement with the USSR.  
This quick overview shows the extent to which projects were numerous and often never 
completed and also the extent to which strategic (access to resources) and competitive aspects 
played a significant part as well as State intervention. From this mass, the Aluminium du 
Cameroun project would eventually emerge. 
 
The economic and financial aspects of the Alucam project 
The project of building an integrated site in Guinea, processing bauxite into refined 
aluminium, proved to be very costly. Lesclous (1999) notes that “the commission des mines 
au Commissariat Général au Plan puts the figure for all of these projects at 100 billion French 
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Francs. ‘Which exceeds the potential of the French private sector and requires a very 
significant contribution from the public authorities that would exceed the funds likely to be 
allocated through the four-year plan for Overseas Territories.’ J. Matter then floated the idea 
of partnering with other European producers to carry out this project” (pp 270). Furthermore, 
the building schedule proved to be too long in relation to market needs, hence their falling 
back on French Cameroun where a project for an aluminium refinement plant at Douala had 
already been studied in 1952 but later abandoned because it consumed too little of the 
abundant and inexpensive energy. This initial project had led to trips into the field and study 
reports in which the participants had examined the various potential sites for implantation. In 
July 1953, a trip by Jean Grolée, Paul Guinet and Jacques Ribadeau-Dumas, representing 
aluminium, energy and administration within Pechiney respectively, finished with the 
comparison of four sites: Douala, Bonaberi to the east, a site between Douala and Edéa 
(Manoka) and, finally, Edéa, next to Douala.  
 
Map n°2 – The Sites Envisaged in Cameroun: Bonaberi, Douala, Edéa 
 
 
There was a large number of selection criteria: the social climate and, in particular, potential 
conflicts between various ethic groups, the cost and the administrative regime governing the 
land, the quality of the ground, the means of transport, the conditions for settling Europeans 
(climate, supplies, etc.), and even the dominant winds (which suggests commendable 
environmental concern for smoke emissions). These different criteria gave preference, still 
provisional, to the site at Edéa. Production costs for the metal produced was calculated on the 
basis of all these factors. The report ended with the production costs for each stage of 22 
 
construction (for capacities of 16,500 and subsequently 45,000 tonnes per year) as well as the 
cost of fixed capital assets at Edéa
11. 
This initial choice was by no means definitive since a new mission, in November 1953, set 
out to conduct a new comparison. The participants this time were Matter, Ribadeau-Dumas, 
Grolée and Castex; senior management and the recently appointed project manager were 
therefore represented. Grolée studied the availability and price of energy and the possible 
extension of hydroelectric works but, in particular, focused on a new comparison of the four 
sites (Bonaberi, Douala, Manoka and Edéa). Once again, Edéa was chosen
12. 
It was during this trip that Ribadeau-Dumas penned a full report on the general situation in 
French Cameroun
13. He described the “state of mind of Camerounians with respect to 
Pechiney-Ugine projects”. Interested parties were classified into several categories: those who 
provided “full support for finding the most favourable solutions to aluminium (always in 
compatibility with the general interest of the Territory)”; those who “are, with respect to the 
interests of the Territory, more coldly calculating” (among these, we find notably the 
administrator-major of Douala who is not keen on an implantation at Edéa); and finally, those 
who view the projects “from very particular angles”, notably Camerounians interested either 
in their personal political future or in the “social development” of the wider population. 
However, economic criteria were not set aside. Ribadeau-Dumas drew up the list complete 
with ample commentary: energy prices, the cost of hydroelectric works, the price of rail 
transport including a description of the network and rolling stock, rights for importing 
building equipment and raw materials.  The reports ended with a summary of relations with 
the Territory’s Assemblée in which the issue of political guarantees was broached. 
In French Cameroun, the building of the Edéa plant was also the subject of a large number of 
successive cost estimates
14. The first “cost estimate” archived followed the trip by Grolée, 
Guinet and Ribadeau-Dumas in July 1953. Provisional expenditure was detailed, for each 
stage of the production process, in terms of types of equipment or installation. “Unforeseen 
costs” worth 20% of the total cost were written in at the end of the estimate. Two “stages” 
follow, the first for an annual production of 16,500 tonnes, the second of 45,000 tonnes. 
These initial forecasts were soon supplemented with forward averaging of expenditure, with 
calculations of financial charges according to the different expenditure plans envisaged and, 
finally, with cash flow forecasts for Pechiney and Ugine, its partner in the operation. Profits 
                                                 
11 Pechiney Archives, 072-10-21964. 
12 Pechiney Archives, 052-2-26615. 
13 Pechiney Archives, 052-2-26615. 
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for the company Alucam were calculated for the first eleven years of its existence. This was 
the first time that profit margins were calculated over several years; for Pechiney’s previous 
investment projects, profit had only been calculated for one year (Pezet, 2000). 
Production costs were also a major factor in decision making. In a note written in January 
1954, Ribadeau-Dumas “reiterates that the US State Department had requested… that we be 
able to provide elements relating to the profitability of the business in Cameroun by 
estimating production costs, for instance, in relation to Norwegian production costs”
15. It was 
therefore at the request of the American government, by the intermediary of the Ministère des 
Affaires étrangères, that Pechiney was required to make cost comparisons between plants. 
The calculation techniques were affected by the new conditions in which the investment was 
taking place. A note written in May 1954 also specified the way to calculate the Edéa plant’s 
production costs
16. In addition to the usual elements, financial charges were included: interest 
on loans, statutory capital interest (5%) and taxes on this statutory loan (22%, the rate then in 
effect in French Cameroun): “interest on the loan and statutory interest are calculated for each 
year according to payments made on one or other of these sources of financing in the course 
of the previous year”. The production cost therefore included financial and fiscal factors, 
including remuneration on the capital (statutory interest). The amount of capital invested and 
the modes of financing weighed heavily on the production cost—no longer the cost of one 
plant so much as that of an entire limited company.  
Another important issue was that of technology and its costs. Between 1940 and 1960, the 
Söderberg process reached its peak
17. Alucam was built around this process. Two other major 
investments in the same period were carried out in France following the same process: Potline 
A at Saint-Jean de Maurienne (1951-1956) and the Noguères plant (1960). These plants 
heralded the period of mass production (87,000 tonnes at Noguères) and yet Noguères was 
also the last of the large Söderberg plants. The process was highly polluting and the 
competing process (prebaked anodes) was making great strides forward. The Saint-Nicolas 
plant in Greece was built according to the prebaking process in 1966. 
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16 Pechiney Archives, 052-2-26615. 
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Table n°2 – The Major Investments in the Period 1950-1970 








Capacity (tn/year)  23 000  34 000  50 000  87 000  72 500 
Electrolysis cost 
(MFr) 
18.8  41.5  52.7  115.1  137.6 
Cost in Fr/tn  816  1 220  1 054  1 323  1 898 
Total Plant Cost 
      (MFr) 
- -    - -    213  328,5  - 
Cost in Fr/tn  - -    - -    4 260  3 776  - 
Source: Pezet (2000) 
The plant in Cameroun was therefore inexpensive in terms of electrolysis (1054 Frs/tn 
compared with an average of 1262 for all five plants). In contrast, extraneous investments in 
the location made it fairly costly in comparison with the plant at Noguères. We should note 
that exercising a certain degree of social responsibility is no stranger to this phenomenon, as 
is also the case with the political aspects of the project.  
 
Public actors, local actors: the influence of networks 
The French State became a major actor in investment decision making due to its financing 
policy. A large part of the long-term loans came from the Crédit National and the Caisse 
centrale de la France d’Outre-mer. In 1952, Pechiney requested a loan of 1 billion French 
Francs from the Fonds de modernisation et d’équipement. In addition to financing, the State 
backed the investment in a variety of ways, firstly in a direct manner by adopting favourable 
fiscal legislation. In its Africa archive, Pechiney possesses a copy of the legal texts relating to 
investments and their financing contained in the Laws of 7
th February and 31
st December 
1953. They specified that “the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs is authorised to give 
the State’s guarantee to loans issued by establishments and companies carrying out the plan 
for modernisation and equipment on the French mainland (…), the plan for economic and 
social development of overseas departments and territories”
18. Government backing was still 
direct when it encouraged investments in Africa within the framework of its overseas policy. 
The Ministère de la France d’outre-mer was very active in the decision making process in 
French Cameroun and even more so in Guinea, where its goal was to find customers for the 
newly nationalised company EDF which had projects drawn up for gigantic dams in this 
country.  
With the Plan, the State intervened in an indirect manner. For French industrialists, the Plan 
created a climate of certainty with respect to a future favourable to investment: “The Plan was 
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defined as an ‘economic dynamic of growth orientated by a forecast’” (Braudel, Labrousse, 
1993, pp 1102). It also intervened more directly in the projects in Guinea with, in 1953, the 
study by the commission des mines au Commissariat général au Plan - see above. 
In French Cameroun, negotiations began with the French authorities—the Ministère de la 
France d’outre-mer was associated with the decision making process as well as the local 
authorities. Pechiney found itself therefore in familiar territory. A mission report in November 
1953 drew up a long list of the personalities encountered
19. Included in the list were a 
representative of the Administration, the High Commissioner in Douala and Yaoundé, the 
General Secretary of the government in Yaoundé, the Director and Cabinet Secretary, the 
Administrator-Mayor of Douala, the Director of Economic Affairs, for whom it is specified 
that he was “X-1932”
20, the Port Director of Douala (X-1944), the Director of Customs and 
Excise, the Head of the Edéa region, and the Director of the Railways of Cameroun (X-1936). 
The list continues with parliamentary representatives: Députés or Senators for African 
constituencies with specific reference to their origins (mainland France or African), their 
political leanings, their professions and also any notable features, such as the case of M. 
Soppo Friso: “African, Senator of Cameroun. President of the Commission des Affaires 
économiques of the ATCAM [Assemblée territoriale du Cameroun]. Director of a building 
company in Douala. Considered very influential and very well informed in both politics and 
in business”. Finally, the list ends with the “representatives of industrial and commercial 
companies”: local representatives from Enelcam (the company generating electricity), from 
Chantiers et Ateliers de Douala (CADO), from Batignolles building company, from United 
Shippers, from the Caisse centrale de la France d’outre-mer and also from the Crédit 
Lyonnais and the Banque nationale pour le commerce et l’industrie (BNCI).  
Their interests were manifold and required significant networking and coordination. Other 
issues came into play, in particular a concern to work towards the development of French 
Cameroun and Africa as a whole. 
 
Africa’s development, a decisive challenge when Alucam was created 
Very early on, some Pechiney managers wondered whether the setting up of foreign 
companies, as in Senegal, Guinea or Tropical Africa, would have positive effects on local 
people's living conditions by bringing their countries into competition with the rest of the 
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world. A 1957 study by Marc-Edmond Morgaut, recruitment manager at Alucam and future 
head of its subsidiary Alubassa, addressed these questions under three headings
21:  
§  Industrialisation and its consequences. He feared that Africans were mistaken in 
believing that “all western countries were ready to compete to settle on their land (…), 
for who could say if the present industrial initiatives would be followed by many 
more?” 
§  The general idea of ‘development’. Regarded as fair compensation for a trading form 
of economy, this development covered mainly public health and schooling. The author 
considered that, despite much effort and expenditure, this was not geared to the “real 
needs of Africans”. 
§  Urban concentrations. In particular, European companies created towns without 
providing them with the means to survive. People flocked in, thus increasing poverty 
and sometimes worsening living conditions: “Everybody now expects the European 
style of thinking, which has made these concentrations possible, to provide them with 
the necessary means for their survival. Coming from a subsistence economy in which 
everyone lived as best he could, these people are cast empty-handed into an exchange 
economy where they find themselves sinking.” 
Morgaut thus regarded the Pechiney set-up as both all-inclusive, since it contributed to 
Africa’s development, and realistic, with industry – and this investment in particular – not 
able to solve all the problems in hand. 
At the same time, Pechiney emphasised Alucam’s part in Cameroon’s development
22. The 
company cautiously recalled that the smelter could not ensure this development by itself, 
thereby protecting itself from future discontent or frustration:  
“We would be failing in our duty as ‘industrialists’ if we were not anxious to 
measure their consequences and the interest—in the best sense of the word—that 
they hold for Cameroonians.  
It is only normal that these consequences should be measured realistically, 
avoiding all exaggeration and also any tendency to underestimate.  
It would be overestimating the human effect of the Edéa scheme if, yielding to 
facile lyricism, we were to see it as a decisive means of putting an end to all the 
difficulties and insufficiencies from which Cameroon, like many other similar 
territories, obviously suffers. The Edéa plant cannot by itself provide Cameroon 
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with the solution to all its economic woes (…) It is not in itself able to achieve – 
as has been said too often – the ‘industrialisation’ of Cameroon.” 
Pechiney stated its position with regard to the arguments put forward by certain opponents, 
notably the anti-colonialist movements, against the project:  
“This being said, the direct opposite of the views expressed by certain 
commentators is just as wrong. It is argued that the plant, though located in 
Cameroon, is nothing or next to nothing for Cameroon. It is allegedly part of some 
sort of ‘trading’ economy, this time with the water of the Sanaga being traded. 
According to such arguments, the ‘aluminium industry’ is simply pillaging one of 
Cameroon's riches – and an unexploited one at that, none of which has been lost – 
to produce a metal of little use to Cameroonians.” 
Lastly, Pechiney stressed the ratchet effect that the creation of Alucam could have. This first 
initiative would provide evidence that it was possible to develop profitable activity in 
Cameroon and would in particular provide an economic, social and human basis for other 
such projects: 
“The first point to note is the moral value of this scheme: (…) Alucam employees 
would become ‘agents in spreading human and social development’ as 
‘distributors of purchasing power’ to the benefit of local and regional craftsmen 
and food crop growers.” 
 
Cameroon’s development, a constant concern for Alucam  
The company's preoccupation with development did not cease after the smelter was started 
up. In 1970, Pechiney again stressed the need for industrialisation and the role of aluminium 
in Cameroon’s “economic take-off”
23. But its words remained cautious, avoiding neither the 
disadvantages of the scheme (investment costs and risk of imbalance in comparison with 
‘harmonious development’: low consumption of the metal in Africa, agriculture, rural 
migration in favour of new industries), nor the problems that continued to exist at Edéa 
(teaching and training, site supervision, monitoring of health, retraining of construction 
workers, improvement of living conditions for rural people). 
Yet the memorandum also pointed to the advantages of the scheme: for individuals (jobs, 
purchasing power, resulting economic activities), for local authorities (taxes, public 
infrastructure) and for the State (fewer imports, improved balances of trade and payments, 
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exports). More generally, the Edéa plant provided wealth, improved protection of the forests 
(firewood), and improvements in the fields of health and inter-African cooperation.  
In addition to this, Alucam’s impact on the country’s economic development was also based, 
from 1960 onwards, on the creation of an aluminium processing industry in Cameroon. 
Indeed, this was stipulated in the 1962 establishment agreement. This sector allowed the State 
to benefit from the value added from processing locally manufactured goods. Moreover, the 
processing industry, like Alucam itself, was responsible to some degree for technology 
transfer via the Cameroonisation of staff. Similarly, the increasing use of local suppliers and 
subcontractors contributed to the development of a local and regional economic network. 
Lastly, Alucam’s participation in financing extensions to the power grid helped with 
industrialisation in the long term.  
Beyond economic factors, the development of Cameroon and Africa was based on a relatively 
innovative social policy. Chronologically, it was this second aspect that characterised 
Pechiney’s practices in Cameroon.  
 
Human and social issues 
With its first real investment outside Metropolitan France, one of the major issues faced by 
Pechiney was that of unknown people, who were unfamiliar with industrial culture and the 
victims of strongly entrenched prejudice. Faced with this situation, Pechiney combined well-
known approaches implemented in France (Bourguinat 1989, 1997; Capello 2002; Grinberg 
& Hachez-Leroy 1997; Vindt 2006) with other more innovative measures such as scientific 
methods of recruitment and the “Cameroonisation” of its staff.  
 
Usual methods: social policy 
From the time it opened its plant in Cameroon, Pechiney adopted the standard approach then 
widespread in French industry, as reflected in the general presentation of the company in 
1965
24: 
“Staff housing and living conditions are paramount for Alucam, as they are for 
Pechiney and Ugine in France.  
There is a slogan claiming that work must mean ‘Well-being for all’. Working in 
the Edéa plant must therefore bring the African, as well as the European, the 
possibility of having access to a better lifestyle. 
                                                 
24 Pechiney/Alcan archives, 05-1-502-BEGUIN 99: Leaflet “Alucam – Edéa plant”, 1965. 29 
 
Finally, Alucam wishes to develop an Alucam spirit among its workforce, that is 
to say, the feeling of belonging to a model industrial organisation in which the 
output expected from each person ensures everyone the benefits of a fair wage, 
the guarantee of a future and safety.” 
 The leaflet goes on to present the three estates built for the staff and associated amenities: 
“A medical and social welfare centre, a shopping centre, schools and children’s 
nurseries, a hotel and clubs.”  
The desire to create a company spirit was often expressed in sporting metaphors, as in this 
editorial by Matter in 1958 in the first issue of the Alucam Bulletin, the employees' magazine 
issued twice a month: 
“I feel that the Alucam Bulletin should also be a token of that ‘team spirit’ which, 
in industry as in sport, should fill all of us.” (Matter 1958 quoted by Filippi 
1998:137). 
Alongside corporate information on production, wages, work accidents, etc., the Alucam 
Bulletin published articles by the medical service on hygiene or diet, a social welfare column 
on education, polygamy, etc. In the ‘good housewife’ section, social workers advised 
workers’ wives. Finally, interviews with managers or workers aimed to mould the behaviour 
of African staff so that it would conform increasingly to western habits. Over and above its 
informative role, the Alucam Bulletin thus became a means of social and cultural conditioning 
in its own right.  
These policies, advanced as they might be in relation to the successive historical contexts in 
which they were implemented, were nevertheless standard practice for a company such as 
Pechiney. It would show itself to be more innovative particularly in matters of staff selection. 
 
Beyond usual methods: staff selection and training  
“Probably the least certain and the least predictable aspect of the issue is: How will black 
workers adapt to our manufacturing processes?” mused a visiting engineer in 1954
25. He went 
on: 
 “In particular, there are human difficulties in operating in a country that knew 
almost nothing about western working conditions and technology. Never again 
shall we see, for example, a regularly employed worker coming in with his wives, 
                                                 
25 Pechiney/Alcan archives, 001-14-20469: Memorandum of February 26th 1954, S.E.C.E.M.A.E.U. (Venthon plant) concerning the Edéa 
project.  30 
 
intending to make them work while he lounged in a deckchair, watching them and 
then receiving his wages.” 
What mattered most to the French was the balance between black and white people in the 
future plant. Their approach was a blend of the usual colonial prejudices, clear politico-
economic interest and moral considerations: 
“Concerning job distribution and collaboration between white and black workers, 
a first solution would be to take the easiest way out and have as many white staff 
as possible, keeping black people only for simple manual work; that is to say, in 
practice, that only white people would be employed in administrative positions. 
This solution is attractive only superficially. (…) It is obvious that we must seek 
to use the local population as much as possible. Several reasons can be given in 
favour of this approach: 
Political reasons: 
It is reasonable to use local workers, in order to avoid having local governments 
introduce quotas. (…) 
Moral reasons: 
The plant must become part of the country in which it is located, and must provide 
the natives with opportunities for improving their intellectual and material 
status”
26. 
The human question thus appeared to be an essential one. Pechiney saw it as a potential 
source of deadlock and was prepared to commit extensive resources to dispel any doubts. In 
this respect, the selection of the labour force was a crucial issue. In 1956, Alucam replaced 
colonial practices, deemed to be rough and obsolete, with a number of scientific methods 
implemented by experts
27:  
“In the old colonial era, workers were selected generally by judging the African 
applying for employment on the basis of his size and appearance. As the saying 
went, you tried a ‘bunch of niggers’ before getting the right one! (...) 
These rough practices, that could at a push be considered acceptable in choosing 
men to carry out simple tasks, were totally inadequate for more complex technical 
work. They were abandoned at Alucam and Fria and were replaced by scientific 
selection methods based on psycho-technical tests carried out by specialised 
services.  
                                                 
26 Pechiney/Alcan archives, 001-14-20469: Memorandum of October 27th 1954: “Administrative organisation of the Edéa plant”. 
27 IHA Archives, 05-1-502-BEGUIN 99: “L’adaptabilité et le commandement de la main-d’œuvre africaine dans les tâches industrielles 
modernes”: talk by Jean-Claude Béguin at Pechiney Supervisors' Training Centre, Feb. – March 1959. 31 
 
Despite the dire predictions and sarcasm of some of the old colonial elite, these 
methods have produced remarkable results.” 
Pechiney proved to be less innovative in training local people. Practices developed elsewhere 
were transposed to Cameroon with the aim of providing technical know-how and holding on 
to a traditionally mobile workforce. Moreover, in addition to being useful for Alucam, the 
training of local staff was one of the Cameroonian government's main expectations right from 
the start of the project, and one of the French company’s major contributions to the country’s 
economy
28: 
“We had been told insistently from the start that this labour force could later be 
dispatched elsewhere to serve as the basis for a network of foremen and work 
supervisors, which generally speaking did not exist in Cameroon at the time.”  
Similarly, the new agreement signed in 1962 with independent Cameroon recalled the 
obligation for companies “to favour the employment of local workers, to develop professional 
and technical training, to facilitate the fastest possible access for Cameroonian citizens to all 




Far beyond usual methods: the staff “Cameroonisation” 
One of Alucam's major policies in the human field was internal promotion or staff 
“Cameroonisation”. In the early days, the plant's managers were exclusively European, but 
Alucam was already expressing the strategic need to train African managers
29: 
“This type of promotion meets two needs: the first is to associate native people 
rapidly with management responsibilities, obviously beginning at the levels 
closest to the workers; the second is that, under the basic principles of sound 
industrial management, shop-floor managers at least should be recruited locally 
with the hope of subsequently finding higher-level staff.” 
Some African workers were thus selected with the intention of making them team leaders. 
The Cameroonisation of foremen began in 1962 but it was only in 1970 that Alucam hired its 
first Cameroonian executive. Cameroonisation was to take many years, sometimes to the 
frustration of the authorities.  
 
                                                 
28 Idem. 
29 Memorandum from Alucam management on February 22
nd 1957, quoted by Filippi 1998:189. 32 
 





From 1970, Alucam came under pressure to speed things up. It became increasingly difficult 
to obtain work permits for expatriate workers. In 1973, Alucam started a five-year plan aimed 
at halving their number, which led to the appointment of the first Cameroonian to a 
managerial position in 1975
31. From 1980 to 1988, the number of expatriate executives 
dropped from 55 to 19. At the present time, several Cameroonians are working in Alcan 
plants throughout the world, providing tangible proof of the success of this Cameroonisation 
policy. 
Well in advance on social matters, Pechiney was, however, behind the times when it came to 
the environment. 
 
The last (and neglected) issue: the environment 
Environment issues were notably absent for many years from the Alucam project. 
Nevertheless, Pechiney knew how to deal with environmental issues in its French plants, such 
as compensation to local residents and investments in antipollution measures (Boullet 1999, 
2000; Donze 1984; Grinberg 2003; Grinberg & Mioche 1996; Loison & Pezet 2006; Menegoz 
1991, 1997). The smelter was not to be equipped with mini-hoods until 1981 even though the 
issue was raised in the mid-1970s at the time the plant extension was studied
32: 
“I have not included fume collectors but it is to be feared that a country that has 
not drawn up stringent pollution control standards in the near future will 
                                                 
30 Pechiney/Alcan archives, annual reports, 1961-1967 and 1972-1974, quoted by Filippi 1998. 
31 Louis Ngounou was appointed administrative deputy manager in 1975, then secretary general of Alucam in 1979. Alu Tam-Tam, 
employees’ magazine, nos. 10 and 11, March 1979. Since then, all operational management positions have been—and still are—occupied by 
Cameroonians.  
32 Pechiney/Alcan archives, 90-8-501-IHA 11/28: Memorandum no.109 of August 8
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increasingly feel under-developed. It is therefore extremely likely that something 
will have to be done in this respect and depending on the severity of the future 
standards that are likely to be introduced, the estimate could be increased by 5 to 
10%. 
(...) 
It is not out of the question that at the time when this project may be implemented, 
that is to say towards the end of the present decade, the Government of Cameroon 
may have introduced outdoor pollution standards as well as standards governing 
working conditions. The overall cost of the project could then be increased from 5 
to 8%, depending on how stringent these standards prove to be.” 
However, this did not elicit particular concern: 
“In principle the problem of pollution should not arise since we can demonstrate 
that the prevailing winds always carry fumes away towards the forest and not 
towards inhabited or cultivated areas. In any case, I feel it is preferable to solve 
the problem by paying a little compensation rather than through costly 
installations.”
33 
However, in 1975, fluorine was detected in the water at Edéa and in the public drinking water 
network. The level measured was 2mg/liter. Pechiney denied this and attempted to prove 
scientifically, through calculations, that such a high level was impossible
34: 
“A simple calculation shows that this quantity of fluorine, around 2mg/liter, 
cannot be produced by the plant (…) Moreover, we seem to remember that the 
water intake is situated upstream from the plant, which rules out any possibility of 
pollution by lining waste, which, it should be recalled, represents around 9 kg of 
fluorine per tonne, i.e. approximately one third of the emissions. In our opinion, 
this reading of 2mg/liter can only be put down to the following causes:  
1/ wrong calculation; 
2/ wrong analysis; 
3/ natural fluorine in the Sanaga.” 
But the company was cautious, since it is rare to find rivers containing levels higher than 1 
mg/litre. They therefore decided to ‘solve the mystery’ by sending a sample to Pechiney’s 
Laboratoire de recherche des fabrications (LRF) in France and to analyse a second one “to 
                                                 
33 Pechiney/Alcan archives, 90-8-501-IHA 11/28: Letter from B. Crétin dated August 21
st 1973 (replying to memorandum no.109 of August 
8
th 1973). 
34 Pechiney/Alcan archives, 001.1.8.39360: Letter of November 4
th 1975. 34 
 
determine the quantity of natural fluorine contained in this river”. The memorandum 
concludes with a political note:  
“The examples we have given above of course clearly show the absurdity of any 
correlation between the plant and the fluorine contained in the river, yet it is 
advisable to put an end as soon as possible to a problem that may lead to 
malicious remarks.” 
Pechiney did not at the time show any signs of being ‘proactive’, which would have put it 
ahead of its time. It should be stressed that the island in the Sanaga was not the most obvious 
place to arouse any such premature awareness. Such is the import of a message sent by 
Maurice Laparra, head of the LRF, to the authors: 
“If such awareness came late in the day at Edéa, it is simply because the fluorine 
pollution, though undeniable, did almost no damage there. The level of damage 
depends not only on the quantity of fluorine discharged but also on climatic 
conditions and the sensitivity of the surrounding vegetation.  
There, rain washes out and winds disperse fumes. In contrast to the smelters in 
France, which are located in steep-sided valleys in the Alps or Pyrenees with a 
cold, dry climate, surrounded by conifer forests, Edéa is located in an equatorial 
region with a warm, humid climate, amid luxuriant deciduous forests where the 
leaves are replaced before necrosis can set in. What goaded Alucam into action 
was therefore the progressive introduction of international standards that all 
aluminium smelters had to comply with.”
35 
The company thus began to show concern for the environment in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, following general trends in the industry with regard to this issue. For instance, in 1982, 
the Pechiney employees' magazine Jalons recalled the “essential objectives” of the extension 
that had just been completed at Edéa 
36: “modernising the plant, increasing production, 
improving working conditions and protecting the environment”. With regard to the last of 
these points, the article goes on to explain that “the installation of new pots provided an 
opportunity to study the gas collection and treatment system” which notably reduced fluorine 
emissions from the smelter. Alucam was neither a precursor, nor a slow learner. A true sense 
of responsibility would only come about when sustainable development became a concern for 
shareholders throughout the world in the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century. 
                                                 
35 Memorandum by Mr Laparra to the authors, July 25
th 2007. 




This paper’s contribution is first and foremost to describe corporate practices that emerged 
before the creation of the social ideal (Berger, Luckmann, 1966) that we refer to today as 
CSR. We have sought to understand the motives of the actors and groups involved in this 
historical process. Indeed, as a social ideal, the concept of CSR only came into common 
discourse and was materialised into devices from the 1990s onwards in line with the concept 
of sustainable development (Moquet, Pezet, 2006; 2005). Yet, the literature—see above—
shows that we can identify notable cases predating this period. These cases relate, however, to 
specific aspects: the environment, social issues, accountability, accounting and reporting, etc. 
The originality of our contribution here is that we describe a situation in which the three 
elements that make up CSR are intertwined—the economic, the social and the environmental. 
Although this combination is not formally materialised, we suggest that it shows early 
awareness—more or less precocious, yet relatively well combined between 1950 and 1980—
of the three pillars of CSR. Why did this growing awareness, followed by concrete steps, 
occur? Over and above the fact, as we have shown, that the aluminium industry was 
confronted early on with social, environmental and, of course, economic issues, the project to 
build a smelter in Cameroon took place in a setting characterised by its degree of uncertainty, 
by major historical changes, and by the existence and creation of routines.  
The major uncertainty was the leap into the unknown constituted, at that time, by any 
investment of this size in sub-Saharan Africa, a totally “un-industrialised” territory. The 
presence of competitors made the project even less certain as did the technical issues (an 
integrated plant or not, choice of the Söderberg process, capacity and electrical power of the 
pots, etc.). Yet it seems that such major uncertainty only served to foster new behaviours 
rather than precluding them. 
The period was also marked by major historical shifts that brought a dose of uncertainty but 
also brought in new ideas that tended towards CSR. Decolonisation in particular was both a 
threat and an opportunity for new practices to emerge with respect to unknown, even feared, 
populations. Pechiney was successful in developing its relations with the new independent 
State and in developing its competencies given the new characteristics of its workforce.  
Finally, the existence and creation of routines enabled the company to innovate without 
causing unnecessary upheaval. The old routines were tied to Pechiney’s experience in 
carrying out investment projects (Pezet, 2000). Yet, new routines emerged in this period, in 
particular in its relations with the French State, which became more interventionist after 36 
 
World War II, and with the new State-owned company EDF, which become the sole energy 
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